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Foreword

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1 Scope

The present document specifies the security architecture, i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms for the Evolved Packet System and the Evolved Packet Core, and the security procedures performed within the evolved Packet System (EPS) including the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and the Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN).

2 References

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- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
- [4] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security".
- [6] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)".
- [7] IETF RFC 4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".
- [8] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture".
- [9] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3".
- [10] – [11] Void.
- [12] 3GPP TS 36.323: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification"
- [13] 3GPP TS 31.102: "Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application".
- [14] 3GPP TS 35.215: "Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications"
- [15] NIST: "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (FIPS PUB 197) "
- [16] NIST Special Publication 800-38A (2001): "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation".
- [17] NIST Special Publication 800-38B (2001): "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication".
- [18] – [20] Void.
- [21] 3GPP TS 36.331: "Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification".