



**LTE;
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and
critical assets in 3GPP network product classes
(3GPP TR 33.926 version 14.0.0 Release 14)**



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Foreword

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1 Scope

The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.

2 References

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- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TR 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP network products classes".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".
- [4] 3GPP TR 33.821: "Rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolution (LTE) RAN/3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.116: "Security Assurance Specification for MME network product class".

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

GNP Class (Generic Network Product Class): generic network product class is a class of network products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities for that particular network product

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

| | |
|-------|----------------------------------|
| GNP | Generic Network Product |
| SCAS | Security Assurance Specification |
| SECAM | Security Assurance Methodology |